

THE FIGURE AND GROUND OF TIME DŌGEN'S *UJI*, HEIDEGGER'S FOURFOLD, AND THE LIMITS OF BEING AND TIME



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This article compares Dōgen's conception of time in the "Uji" fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō with Heidegger's early and later accounts of temporality. While previous comparative studies have concentrated on Being and Time, this article draws on recently published posthumous manuscripts to clarify the significance of Heidegger's later thought. The distinction between the "figure" and "ground" of time provides a framework for examining two shared concerns: the temporal horizon within which individual moments become meaningful, and detachment from excessive concern with the present. I argue that Being and Time remains limited by its orientation toward Dasein's finite existence and its projection of possibilities. Dōgen's account of being-time (uji), by contrast, articulates a more radically non-anthropocentric and non-teleological temporal field. Heidegger's later reflections on time-space, the fourfold, and the fourth dimension of time extend the temporal horizon beyond individual existence and challenge the subordination of time to human purposes. These developments bring Heidegger's later conception of time closer to Dōgen's and provide grounds for reconsidering claims of residual anthropocentrism in his later thought. The comparison reveals an affinity between Dōgen and later Heidegger in their understanding of time as a relational ground that exceeds human control and calls for receptivity, detachment, and awe. An earlier version of this article was presented on 8 March 2025 at the workshop "Japanese Philosophy and its Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger," held at the NIRC.

THIS STUDY undertakes a comparative analysis of Martin Heidegger's and Dōgen's respective conceptions of time. Both Heidegger's seminal work *Being and Time* and Dōgen's "Uji" fascicle in his major work *Shōbōgenzō* feature the notions of "being" (Sein, 有) and "time" (Zeit, 時) in their titles, and scholars have frequently noted the conceptual affinities between their perspectives.¹ However, existing research has primarily focused on

1. For a history of comparative studies of Dōgen and Heidegger, see the preface by Heine in Abe (1992).

early Heidegger—particularly *Being and Time*—in comparison with Dōgen, while examinations of later Heidegger, especially his notion of the “fourfold” (*Geviert*), in relation to Dōgen remain limited. One possible reason for this scholarly gap is the relative scarcity and complexity of Heidegger’s later discussions on time. For instance, his lecture “Time and Being” (1962) appears somewhat abruptly in relation to his earlier discussions of time. Furthermore, even within Heidegger scholarship, no definitive consensus has been reached regarding the interpretation of his later thought on time. Nevertheless, with the recent publication of the so-called Black Notebooks (GA 94–102) and other posthumous manuscripts (GA 80, 82, 91, etc.), Heidegger’s later reflections on time are becoming increasingly accessible to analysis.²

This article first examines the relationship between Heidegger and Dōgen in general in light of previous scholarship. It will then extend the comparative inquiry to later Heidegger’s conception of time in relation to Dōgen’s thought. I argue that, in certain respects, Heidegger’s later thought exhibits a greater affinity with Dōgen’s conception of time than does his earlier work.³ This article uses the distinction between “figure” and “ground” as a heuristic framework. The “figure” of time refers to a determinate present moment, event, or being that appears within ordinary experience. The “ground” of time refers to the wider temporal and relational field that allows such a figure to appear as meaningful. In Dōgen, this ground is articulated through notions such as *uji*, *nikon*, *jinkai*, and *kū*. In Heidegger, it appears first through concepts such as significance, horizon, and temporality in *Being and Time*, and later as the fourfold and the fourth dimension of time. Heidegger’s fourfold is his later name for the relational gathering of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. It is not a cosmological theory in the ordinary sense, but a way of describing how things appear within a world that exceeds human control and instrumental use. This article argues that Heidegger’s later thought comes closer to Dōgen’s “Uji” because it radicalizes the non-anthropocentric and non-teleological character of this temporal ground.

2. I have recently been working with posthumous manuscripts to clarify Heidegger’s theory of time in his middle and later period. See Nukui (2020), (2022), (2024), and (2025).

3. A key advantage of comparative research lies in its capacity to transcend the specific terminologies employed by individual thinkers, thereby abstracting their ideas from the confines of Heidegger and Dōgen studies. The comparative process necessitates the adoption of a more general conceptual framework, facilitating engagement with broader philosophical discourse beyond the immediate context of these two figures. It is my hope that this study will not only contribute to the interpretation of Heidegger and Dōgen but also offer meaningful insights into the broader fields of temporality, philosophy, Christianity and Buddhist thought.

Commonalities in Heidegger's and Dōgen's Philosophical Projects: Against "Scholastic" Understandings

As Heine shows, Heidegger and Dōgen "both attempt to overcome their respective philosophical traditions" because they both feel that those traditions "express unacknowledged and deficient presuppositions concerning time."⁴ Dōgen and Heidegger both maintain that "the problematics of existence and the limitations of metaphysics are fundamentally and directly related to basic misconceptions concerning time."⁵ Both Heine and Stambaugh emphasize a fundamental philosophical parallel between Dōgen and Nāgārjuna: both Dōgen and Nāgārjuna conceptualize liberation as intrinsic to samsara rather than as a transcendent state beyond it. The Abhidharma school traditionally regarded liberation as an event occurring beyond time.⁶ In contrast, Nāgārjuna posited that liberation can occur at all times. As Stambaugh notes, "Dōgen follows Nāgārjuna in his rejection of nirvana or liberation as something beyond the cycles of birth and death."⁷ Nāgārjuna, a second-century thinker of the Madhyamaka school, criticized substantialist readings of Buddhist teaching through his emphasis on emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Dōgen, writing in thirteenth-century Japan within the quite different setting of Zen, nevertheless continues this anti-substantialist line of thought. In contrast, the Abhidharma tradition is understood here as a scholastic system that tends to analyze reality into distinct dharmas and to separate liberation from ordinary temporal existence.

Like Nāgārjuna, Dōgen rejects the notion that anything can exist beyond time. Instead, he perceives time and the being of things as fundamentally interdependent and inseparable, and it is precisely within this inseparability that he locates liberation.⁸ However, while Nāgārjuna articulates his philosophy through "logical" argumentation,⁹ Dōgen approaches the subject from an "experiential and phenomenological" perspective.¹⁰ Through concrete examples, such as pine trees, mountains, and the human condition, Dōgen demonstrates that being cannot be conceived apart from time. Thus, he critiques what Stambaugh refers to as "Buddhist scholasticism."¹¹

4. Heine (1985), preface.

5. Heine (1985), 1.

6. Heine (1985), 6–7; Stambaugh (1990), 25.

7. Stambaugh (1990), 1.

8. Tsunoda (1997), 87.

9. Sakurabe and Ueyama (1996), 240. If there is one immutable law called karma, it should not disappear forever, even after some consequences have occurred. (There should be no escape from karma forever.) In contrast, if karma is not permanent, then it is gone by the time any result occurs, so it cannot even produce a result. (There should be no karma in the first place.)

10. Stambaugh (1990, 1) states: "Thus, while Nāgārjuna's orientation was primarily logical, that of Dōgen is experiential and phenomenological."

11. Stambaugh (1990), 25.

Heidegger and Dōgen share a fundamental philosophical orientation. A comparable structure can be found in Heidegger's early engagement with Christianity. In Heidegger's 1920–21 interpretation of the Pauline Epistles in the New Testament, Heidegger critiques the conventional understanding of eschatological waiting, which frames the anticipation of God's return in a linear, sequential manner. That is, he rejects the notion that one simply waits for God's Second Coming at a determinate point in linear time. Instead, Heidegger proposes that the very disposition of waiting for God's kingdom itself already has a religious—or even divine—character. For Heidegger, such a divine character is not situated beyond worldly time, as if it emerges only when temporal existence ceases; rather, it coexists with time.

This perspective closely parallels Dōgen's conception of liberation as being possible within time rather than outside of it. Both Dōgen and Heidegger challenge scholastic interpretations of their respective traditions, advocating for an understanding of phenomena in accordance with phenomena themselves. Thus, they seek a more authentic understanding of their respective traditions. Rather than perceiving events as merely occurring within a linear temporal flow, both thinkers understand past and future events within a non-linear temporal structure, relating past, present, and future to the self in a fundamental sense—expressed in Dōgen's case as “myself” (*ware われ*) and in Heidegger's as “*Dasein*.” Furthermore, both critique the instrumentalization of the present as merely a means to the future. In other words, they reject the interpretation—found in both Christianity and Buddhism—that this life (or the present) exists primarily for the sake of the next life (or the future). Instead, they emphasize the immediacy of the present, maintaining an awareness that truth can manifest itself at any moment. As Tsunoda observes, “Dōgen's esoteric philosophical thought on worldview, ontology, and temporality may seem to lead to a simple conclusion: life is really a series of ‘living’ in the ‘here’ and ‘now,’ and we are reminded that we must strive to do so.”¹² For Dōgen, enlightenment entails a capacity to perceive time from a broader, all-encompassing perspective, and this state of realization can occur at any moment. Similarly, for Heidegger, each present moment is of great importance, offering the existential “choice” (*Wahl*) between authentic existence and a reversion to inauthentic existence. In Heidegger's view, to delay this choice by reasoning that death remains distant or that the Second Coming is yet to arrive constitutes an evasion of the possibility of authentic existence. Having outlined the general similarities between Dōgen and Heidegger by drawing upon previous scholarship, I will now examine these commonalities in more depth, specifically through the lens of the relationship between “figure” and “ground” in their respective conceptions of time.

12. Tsunoda (2001), 88.

Commonalities in Heidegger's and Dōgen's Conceptions of Time (1): The Condition for the Meaning of the Present (Horizontalty)

One of the most striking similarities between Dōgen's and Heidegger's conceptions of time is their rejection of the idea that the present moment arises independently. Instead, they emphasize that time as a whole—past, present, and future—functions as the movement that makes the present possible (this totality of time will be referred to in this paper as “time as ground” or “context,” the contextual horizon within which each present moment becomes meaningful). Dōgen designates this all-encompassing temporality as “*nikon*” (而今, right now) and equates it with “*jinkai*” (尽界), meaning “the entire world.”

Similarly, in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, the holistic conception of time is articulated through the notion of “significance” (*Bedeutsamkeit*) (sz, 87), which is also referred to as “worldliness” (*Weltlichkeit*) (sz, 83). In the discussion of time in Division Two of Part One of *Being and Time*, Heidegger further elaborates on this as the temporal “horizon” (*Horizont*) (sz, 365), also known as “Temporalität” (GA 24: 324), and reinterprets this horizon as the “world” (*Welt*) (sz, 366). “Horizontalty” here means that a present thing or moment becomes meaningful only against a wider background. To examine these ideas in more depth, we will first consider Dōgen's perspective before turning to Heidegger's.

Dōgen's Concept of the World: Jinkai

In Dōgen's major work, *Shōbōgenzō*, he frequently employs the phrase “*jinjippōkai kore ikkamyōju*” 尽十方界は一顆明珠, which translates to “the entire world is one brightly shining gem.” For Dōgen, this world—this luminous jewel—is also “*kū*” 空 (emptiness).¹³ Emptiness does not mean sheer nothingness. Rather, it signifies “*mujishō*” 無自性, the absence of independent self-nature: nothing possesses a self-sustaining essence, and all things exist only through relations, conditions, and mutual dependence. Dōgen refers to the totality of this interdependence as “the entire world” (*henhōkai* 遍法界, the pervasive dharma world, or *jinjippōkai*).¹⁴

Dōgen's Concept of Time and Being: Uji

The concept of this world as *kū* also appears in the *Uji* fascicle of *Shōbōgenzō*. In *Uji*, Dōgen states: “I arrange and place myself (*ware* われ) as the entire world (*jinkai* 尽界). Each thing in this entire world should be thought of as each time.”¹⁵ “For this reason [that being, time, and self are one and the same], we must learn that various things and events exist in the entire ground (*jinchī* 尽地) and that each and every

13. Yorizumi (2005), 58.

14. Yorizumi (2005), 58.

15. The text of Dōgen in this paper is from Masutani (2006) and Takahashi (1971).

thing exists against the background of the entire ground.” “The mouse is time, the tiger is time, living is time, and the buddha is time.” These passages suggest that “the entire world” is constituted by “myself” (*ware* われ) that is positioned and arranged. At any given time, something, which is “myself” (*ware* われ), exists. In the background of that time, there exists “*jinkai*,” or in other words, the totality of time, which is the totality of “myself” (*ware* われ) that has existed until then and will exist in the future. Yorizumi illustrates this totality, or “*jinkai*,” as follows:




FIGURE 1: Diagram from Yorizumi (2005), 103.

The Figure and Ground of Time for Dōgen

Iwata interprets the same passage from Dōgen (“I arrange and place myself as the entire world. Each thing in this entire world should be thought of as each time”) through the framework of the relationship between the “figure” (*gara* 柄) and the “ground” (*ji* 地) of time.¹⁶ The “figure” of time refers to distinct temporal instances, expressed as “at a certain time...” and “at a certain time...”—corresponding to the central “mountain top” (a black point) in Yorizumi’s illustration. The “ground” of time, by contrast, serves as the background that enables the “figure” of time to appear as a discrete moment. This ground corresponds to the areas surrounding the central mountain top in Yorizumi’s picture. Iwata states: “if we interpret “*u-ji* 有時” as “*aru-toki*” (at a certain time), it is the same as in our everyday usage, which means that what is at issue is the “figure” of time. However, if we read it as “*u-ji*” (being-time), it is probably trying to show the form of the “ground” of time. At

16. I translate *gara* 柄 as “figure” rather than “pattern” in order to emphasize its contrast with *ji* 地, “ground.”

least, we are looking at the “figure” from the “ground” of time, just as if we were looking at the shape of the waves shimmering above our heads from underwater.”¹⁷

Moreover, this “ground” functions as the site where multiple “figures” of time coexist. Iwata further argues that there exists a kind of “place” where the “time” of forty years ago and the “time” of today intersect and coexist. This “place” constitutes the very “core” of one’s being, and this totality of “place” is, in essence, the totality of time.¹⁸ This idea parallels the representation of time through the illustration of mountains by Yōrizumi. In this “ground” of time, there is no passage of time in the usual sense of the word. The particular movement of the “ground” of time is called “*kyōryaku* 経歴” by Dōgen (and Heidegger would call it “happening” [*Geschehen*]). In *Uji*, Dōgen writes: “*Kyōryaku* is from today to tomorrow, from today to yesterday, from yesterday to today, from today to today, from tomorrow to tomorrow.”¹⁹ What “is” there in the “ground” of time does not pass away, but continues to exist, and continues to influence the present, “figure” of time.²⁰

Kū and the Figure and Ground of Time

The concept of *kū* 空 (emptiness) signifies that no being exists independently but always arises in relation to other beings. In other words, the “figure” of each moment is inseparable from the “figure” of other moments, which together form the “ground” of time as its totality. Yōrizumi explains this interdependent nature of existence as follows: “in everyday consciousness, one’s self and the other objects are considered to exist as separate entities, but Dōgen rejects this elemental reductionist attitude and insists that being is only possible when it is signified by the self...

17. Iwata (2007), 224–225. “Dōgen’s use of the word “*uji*” is, of course, different from our everyday usage of the word. It has a variety of meanings and its meaning fluctuates. Therefore, it is useful to organize them and describe the two types of time in advance. The first is the “figure of time” and the second is the “ground of time.” Time has its “figure” and “ground” just as in the waters of rivers and oceans, waves are the “figure of water,” while water in the deep or water itself is the “ground of water.” The water that flows smoothly and noisily is the “figure” of the water, while the water that is blue in color at the edge and shows a clear and calm surface is the “ground” of the water.” For further discussion, see also Iwata (2007), 225.

18. Iwata (2007), 252.

19. The original text of Dōgen is: 今日より明日へ経歴す、今日より昨日に経歴す、昨日より今日へ経歴す、今日より今日に経歴す、明日より明日に経歴す。

20. Dōgen’s “ground” of time may also have a certain commonality with the temporality in Freud’s “unconscious.” The characteristics of the time in the unconscious, which Freud (1933) says is “highly peculiar and awaits appreciation in philosophical thought,” are as follows: “In Es, there is nothing that corresponds to the [ordinary] concept of time (*Zeitvorstellung*), no recognition of a temporal sequence (*ein zeitlicher Ablauf*); and, what is highly peculiar and awaits appreciation in philosophical thought is that there is no change in the mental process due to the passing of time. Desiring-impulses (*Wunschregungen*) that have never crossed [the boundary of] Es, as well as impressions that have sunk into Es through repression, are virtually immortal (*unsterblich*), behaving after decades as if they had happened for the first time (*neu vorgefallen wären*).” The same could be said for Heidegger’s “having-been” (*das Gewesen*) or Freud’s unconscious. Derrida (1967) also points out the similarity between Heidegger’s “always already” (*immer schon*) and Freud’s unconscious.

For example, the existence of a ‘flower’ is possible in its difference from a ‘tree’ and a ‘stone.’ A ‘flower’ is not a ‘flower’ by itself, but becomes a ‘flower’ when one’s self divides his world and ‘arranges’ it into ‘flowers,’ ‘trees,’ ‘stones,’... and a ‘flower’ becomes a ‘flower’ when it has a differentiating relationship with a ‘tree,’ a ‘stone,’ and other beings.”²¹ The functioning of time as this underlying structure is referred to in this paper as the “contextuality” of time. This term signifies that no moment exists in isolation; rather, each moment is constituted through its relational positioning within the totality of past, present, and future.

Similarities between Kū and Heidegger’s Theory of Time

Both Dōgen’s “Uji” and Heidegger’s *Being and Time* share a fundamental concern with the contextuality of time. In *Being and Time*, a “hammer” cannot exist on its own, but only within a web of interdependent relations, within the temporal structure of being, can a “hammer” be defined as a “hammer.” Heidegger calls this structure “significance” (*Bedeutsamkeit*) (sz, 83).

Todoroki observes that Heidegger consistently emphasizes the contextuality of time throughout his work, regardless of the period: “when we see a flying bird, we perceive not only what the bird is doing now, but also what it has already been and what it could be in the future, i.e., ‘from where’ and ‘to where’ of the bird. In other words, when we understand that a bird is ‘flying,’ we understand not only the ‘present’ but also the ‘past’ and the ‘future,’ and based on this very understanding, we understand the bird’s ‘flying’ as ‘flying.’”²² “‘Being’ has some kind of contextuality, and the meaning of ‘being’ can be understood only by grasping this context. It is fair to say that Heidegger redefines this context as ‘time.’”²³ “The inauthentic way of *Dasein* means an attitude that separates a being from its relationships with various other beings that are essential to its being, and makes it alone present. The authentic way of being, on the contrary, is an attitude that sees a being in relation to the surrounding beings.”²⁴ Moreover, Todoroki notes a conceptual parallel between the Buddhist notion of emptiness and Heidegger’s temporal ontology, although he does not explicitly connect Heidegger’s ideas to Dōgen’s. Both the Buddhist idea of emptiness and Heidegger’s account of temporality suggest that each being and each time has its own context (background context) which is indispensable for its formation, and the recognition of this relational structure is called “enlightenment” (*satori* 悟り) in Buddhism and “authenticity” (*Eigentlichkeit*) for Heidegger.²⁵

21. Yorizumi (2021), 138.

22. Todoroki (2017), 37.

23. Todoroki (2017), 37.

24. Todoroki (2017), 47.

25. Todoroki (2017), 48–50, 422–423.

As previously discussed, Dōgen's thought on time is rooted in an emphasis on emptiness. According to Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*, *Genjō kōan*, "To practice and realize all things (*banbō* 万法) by carrying oneself is to be lost. To practice and realize oneself when all things come forward is enlightenment."²⁶ Here, "*banbō*" means "all beings."²⁷ Takahashi interprets this as follows: "lostness is the act of establishing the self (which should not be able to be established) and working on all objects. Enlightenment is the illumination of the self from the side of the objects, which should constitute a unified whole."²⁸ In the experience of enlightenment, time is perceived from an expanded, all-encompassing perspective. What is ordinarily conceived as the non-self or the other is recognized as integral to the self. Everything is understood as the time of the self.

Commonalities in Heidegger's and Dōgen's Conceptions of Time (2): The Relaxation of an Excessive Preoccupation with the Present (Detachment)

Beyond the interplay of the "figure" and "ground" of time, another significant commonality between Dōgen and Heidegger is their shared emphasis on the liberation of the individual from attachment to the mundane. In Heidegger's *Being and Time*, this liberation involves breaking free from the inauthentic existence of the everyday self (*das Man*), while in Dōgen's thought, it corresponds to the realization of emptiness. Furthermore, this process is intimately linked to an expansion of temporal awareness—the ability to perceive time in its totality. This transformation is from an ordinary state, in which one fixates solely on the immediate "figure" before them, to an enlightened state, in which one perceives time as the "ground."

The Time Structure of "Significance" (Heidegger)

In Heidegger's framework, the everyday structure of "significance" is constituted through the "projection" (*Entwurf*) of a particular "possibility of *Dasein*'s being," which is situated before the possibility of one's death. Heidegger's "significance" does not mean subjective importance. It refers to the network of practical relations within which something shows up as what it is. For instance, when the possibility of "protection against bad weather" is projected, a given being X is interpreted as a "hammer" or as a "tool," serving as a means of realizing this possibility (sz, 84).²⁹

26. Nishitani (1972) also quotes this passage by Dōgen several times in his *What is Religion?* For example, on p. 184, he also considers it in conjunction with Heidegger's later thought.

27. Masutani (2006), 42.

28. Takahashi (1971), 10.

29. English quotations from *Being and Time* follow Joan Stambaugh's translation; see Heidegger (1996). The following passage is from p. 78 (sz, 84): "For example, the thing at hand which we call a hammer has

However, when the projected possibility shifts to “defending oneself against an armed group,” for example, the same being X may instead be interpreted as a “weapon,” functioning as an instrument for combat. Thus, the interpretation of any given being is contingent upon the specific projection at play. While a being may be understood in multiple ways (as a tool, a weapon, etc.), the interpretation that most effectively serves the realization of *Dasein*’s possibility tends to take precedence.

This is the structure of everyday “significance.” However, when the possibility of one’s own death is understood as an imminent and ever-present possibility, these ordinary hierarchies of importance cease to function. This is because when faced with the possibility of death, the ordinary “in-order-to” (*das Um-zu*) linkage (which presupposes that one will not die for some time) ceases to function. No matter what we do or do not do, death, when it comes, will come. Since we can die without doing anything (without using any means), no interpretation of a being can function as a “means” in the face of death. In the face of death, their ordinary hierarchy of practical significance collapses. As a result, a state of “insignificance” (*Unbedeutsamkeit*) emerges (sz, 186), and even in “the authentic existence of *Da-sein*,” its “taking care” (*Besorgen*) becomes “indifferent” (*gleichgültig*) for itself (sz, 352).³⁰

This “indifferent” perspective offers insight into an alternative experience of time—one that differs fundamentally from the ordinary, linear understanding of temporality. In this experience, every moment of one’s past, present, and future is valued as equivalent, without hierarchical distinction, and is apprehended as integral to one’s own being.

Heidegger’s conception of time in this regard may resonate with Bergson’s philosophy. According to Bergson, when one’s “attention to life” (*attention à la vie*) “diminishes” (*faiblir*), time ceases to be structured in a manner conducive to the pragmatic demands of daily existence. As he observes in *Spiritual Energy* (1922): “now, if your attention to life (*l’attention à la vie*) diminishes (*faiblir*) for a moment,... then the mind, whose gaze was forcibly directed forward, relaxes (*se détend*) and thereby looks back, where the mind finds all its history (*toute son histoire*). The panoramic vision of the past is therefore due to a sudden disinterest (*désintéressement*) in life, born of the sudden conviction that one is going to die at any moment.”³¹ For Bergson, this “sudden disinterest in life” allows the past—typically subordinated to the demands of the present—to resurface in its own right, liberated from its usual instrumentalization.

to do with hammering, the hammering has to do with fastening something, fastening something has to do with protection against bad weather. This protection “is” for the sake of providing shelter for *Dasein*, that is, for the sake of a possibility of its being.”

30. The relationship between insignificance and the authentic existence of *Dasein* is complex and will not be entered into here. See Nukui (2021) for more details on this relationship.

31. Bergson (1922), 82.

A similar movement of time is evident in Heidegger's notion of time as something that "stretches out" (*sich erstrecken*). The possibility of recognizing wider temporalities—what Heidegger refers to as the "extension of *Dasein* between birth and death" (*die Erstreckung des Daseins zwischen Geburt und Tod*) (sz, 373)—ordinarily obscured by everyday absorption in the world, is reawakened as something that truly belongs to *Dasein*. This recognition, in turn, enables the existential process of authentic "projection" and "retrieval" (*Wiederholung*) (sz, 385), through which time is reclaimed in its authentic dimension.

The Time Structure of Kū (Dōgen)

Analogous to Heidegger's notion of the ever-present possibility of death (*der Tod, das Vorbei*) and Bergson's idea of detachment from present-centered consciousness, Dōgen's philosophy is characterized by the recognition of *kū*—the impermanence and non-substantiality of all things. This entails an awareness that all phenomena lack fixed essence and cannot serve as ultimate objects of attachment. Through *kū*, one attains a non-discriminatory apprehension of time—a perspective in which all temporal moments, whether joyous or sorrowful, sacred or mundane, are understood as constituting an undifferentiated "array" of the self. In this sense, all moments are of equal significance, equally proximate, and equally detached from hierarchical valuation.

Minami articulates this idea as follows: "the time consciousness that lies before our everyday time consciousness, the time consciousness that lies before the division of time into past, present, and future, if we dare to call the former time consciousness 'original temporality,' in the 'Uji' fascicle, such temporality is called '*nikon*' 而今 (or *shikin*), and the way of the movement of '*nikon*' is called *kyōryaku* 経歴."³² What this means is that time that "flows" and "passes" cannot be realized unless the act or the memory of the act is arranged with a sense of purpose (*mokuteki* 目的) in mind. If a person who needs to hurry to his destination (*mokutekichi* 目的地) gets on a train, he will be conscious at every station that "I am here now, I will be there next, and I am almost there." It is in this consciousness that the scenery seen from the window of the train "flows" and "passes." But for those who are riding vaguely or wandering without any particular purpose (*mokuteki*), it does not matter at all when and where they arrive. Then the view from the window is merely changing within the window frame. Even when we recall the scenery later, there is no clear back and forth order in our memories, and we will only be able to talk about how we saw this and that. This is the "time to look over a thousand peaks 千峰万峰をみわたす時節," a situation that is said to "not pass away すぎぬるにあらず" (by Dōgen). When climbers stand at the top of a mountain and take a break

32. Minami (2008), 145.

to look around at the mountain peaks, they do not necessarily look at them in the order in which they climbed them.”³³

In essence, Heidegger, Bergson, and Dōgen converge on a fundamental insight: detachment from one’s immediate pragmatic concerns—whether Heidegger’s projected everyday “possibility,” Bergson’s “attention to life,” or Dōgen’s ordinary man’s (*bonbu* 凡夫) teleological view of time—enables a broader, panoramic apprehension of time. (By “teleological,” I mean a structure in which the meaning of the present is organized in relation to an end or purpose.) This expanded temporal awareness manifests itself as “stretched” time in Heidegger’s thought, a “panoramic view” in Bergson’s, and “*nikon*” in Dōgen’s. In all three cases, time is experienced as an undivided whole, wherein past, present, and future are recognized as equally integral to one’s being, equally proximate, and equally freed from instrumental valuation.

Early Heidegger’s Pauline Interpretation

A parallel structure can be observed in Heidegger’s early theological reflections, particularly in his 1920–21 Pauline interpretation, which anticipates several themes later developed in *Being and Time*.³⁴ In interpreting First Corinthians 7:29–32, Heidegger articulates a stance toward the world that closely resembles his later notion of anticipation of death. Of particular importance is Paul’s repeated construction ὡς μὴ (“as though not” / “as if not”): “But this I say, brethren, the time is short: it remaineth, that both they that have wives be as though they had none; And they that weep, as though they wept not; and they that rejoice, as though they rejoiced not; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; And they that use this world, as not abusing it: for the fashion of this world passeth away.”³⁵

Heidegger emphasizes that Paul does not use “οὐ” (*ou*, negation) but “ὡς μὴ” (*hōs mē*, as though not), signaling an attitude of detachment rather than outright denial. Heidegger argues that Christian existence is characterized by an acute awareness of the “compressed temporality” (*zusammengedrängte Zeitlichkeit*), in which the believer must live constantly in “the Little... Left” (*das Nur-Noch*), without deferring action into an indefinite future. This urgency precludes “procrastination” (*Hinausschieben*) and necessitates a mode of being in which one is simultaneously engaged with the world and yet not wholly defined by it.³⁶

33. Minami (2008), 152–153.

34. Macquarrie (1994).

35. The English quotation is from 1 Corinthians 7: 29–31 (KJV). The Greek text is as follows: τοῦτο δέ φημι, ἀδελφοί, ὁ καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστίν, ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες γυναῖκας ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες ᾧσι, καὶ οἱ κλαίοντες ὡς μὴ κλαίοντες, καὶ οἱ χαίροντες ὡς μὴ χαίροντες, καὶ οἱ ἀγοράζοντες ὡς μὴ κατέχοντες, καὶ οἱ χρῶμενοι τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ ὡς μὴ καταχράμενοι· παράγει γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου.

36. Heidegger GA 60: 119–120. “There is little time left, the Christian lives constantly in the Little... Left (*das Nur-Noch*), which increases his distress. The compressed temporality (*zusammengedrängte*

This notion parallels Dōgen's critique of conventional attachment, wherein an unenlightened individual (*bonbu* 凡夫) perceives only certain moments as integral to the self while excluding others. In contrast, the enlightened perspective regards all moments as equally constitutive of one's being, without privileging one temporal moment over another.

In this expanded view of time, Heidegger sees the possibility of reinterpreting one's past, future, and present in a manner fundamentally distinct from the conventional, goal-oriented experience of time. Dōgen, likewise, argues that Buddhist enlightenment is not a matter of attaining some future state beyond one's present condition but rather a realization of time itself from a vantage point unbounded by teleological constraints. Ultimately, both thinkers locate the essence of their respective traditions—Christianity and Buddhism—not in doctrinal formulations but in this transformed understanding of time as a totality.

Differences between early Heidegger's and Dōgen's Conceptions of Time: the Limits of (1) Horizontality and (2) Detachment in the "Tool World" of *Being and Time*

In the preceding discussion, this paper has delineated the fundamental similarities between Dōgen's and Heidegger's conceptions of temporality. For both thinkers, the "ground" of time is characterized by (1) its role as the condition that renders the meaning of the present possible (horizontality) and (2) a state of detachment from an excessive preoccupation with the present, allowing for a more comprehensive, panoramic view of temporality.

Abe, however, contends that early Heidegger differs fundamentally from Dōgen, as Heidegger ultimately maintains an "anthropocentric" framework.³⁷ Here "anthropocentric" does not mean that Heidegger values human beings more than other beings. It means that the structure of world and time is still analyzed primarily from the standpoint of *Dasein*, that is, human existence. Although there are significant thematic parallels between the early Heidegger and Dōgen, Abe's claim is persuasive in this respect. This difference, I argue, stems from the fact that, in the early Heidegger, despite the emphasis placed on (1) horizontality and (2) detachment from immediate temporal concern in "time as ground," Heidegger's conception of temporality remains fundamentally anthropocentric and teleological.

(1) For the first point, in *Being and Time*, the boundaries of "time as ground" are limited to the individual's "birth" (*Geburt*) and "death" (*Tod*) (sz, 373). (2) For the

Zeitlichkeit) is constitutive of Christian religiosity: a "Little... left"; there is no time to procrastinate (*zum Hinausschieben*). Christians should be such that those who have wives have them in such a way that they do not have them, etc."

37. Abe (1992), 126–128.

second point, even when Heidegger describes the process by which extreme concern for the present is relinquished in anticipation of death, enabling the projection of authentic possibilities and the retrieval (*Wiederholung*) of the forgotten past, “time as ground” remains structured teleologically by an authentically projected purpose.

However, Heidegger’s posthumously published manuscripts (GA 82) indicate that by the mid-1930s, he had grown self-critical of these aspects of *Being and Time*. He acknowledges what he calls an “error” (*Irrtum*) in his earlier work, particularly in defining *Dasein* as an entity that exists “for the sake of itself” (*existierend umwollen seiner*). In 1936, he writes: “the deepest error (*Irrtum*) in *Being and Time*... is first of all the determination of *Dasein* as existing for the sake of itself (*existierend umwollen seiner*).... *Dasein* is neither for the sake of itself nor at all for the sake of (*es ist weder umwollen seiner noch überhaupt umwollen*). ‘For the sake of (*Umwollen seiner*)’ arises from the existential approach—care (*Sorge*)—instead of fighting (*Bestreitung*)” (GA 82: 174–175). “Connection of history (*Geschichte*) and world, but existentially bent (*existenzial verbogen*)! and narrowed to ‘tool’ world (*auf »Zeug« Welt verengt*)!” (GA 82: 132).

To restate this in relation to the core argument of this article, “time as ground” in *Being and Time* was conceived in an anthropocentric and teleological manner. This teleological structuring of the world concept in *Being and Time* is precisely what Lévinas critiques in his *Totality and Infinity* (1961). According to Lévinas, “activity does not borrow its meaning and value from a single, ultimate goal, as if the world formed a system of useful references, the end of which concerns our very existence.”³⁸ “The tools themselves, which are-in-order-to... (*sont-en-vue-de*...) become objects of pleasure (*jouissance*).”³⁹ Yet, significantly, prior to the criticism by Lévinas, Heidegger himself had already begun to critically reassess this teleological orientation of temporality in *Being and Time* by the mid-1930s and initiated the line of thinking that would later culminate in the fourfold. His work in the mid-1930s introduced the concept of “time-space” (*Zeit-Raum*) as a non-objective, non-anthropocentric articulation of time.

Abe and Heine, though for somewhat different reasons, question whether Heidegger’s later thought completely overcomes the anthropocentric limitations of his earlier philosophy and thus reaches the radically de-anthropocentric standpoint they find in Dōgen.⁴⁰ Abe maintains that even in Heidegger’s later thought, “the priority of openness over presence, that is, the priority of time over being, shows a trace of anthropocentrism.”⁴¹ However, this claim remains debatable. It is not

38. Lévinas (1961), 106–107.

39. Lévinas (1961), 106.

40. Abe (1992), 72, 126–128; Heine (1985), 101.

41. Abe (1992), 130. Abe’s criticism, however, requires some qualification. He does not simply maintain

evident that, even in his later philosophy, Heidegger's conception of temporality retains the residual anthropocentrism that Abe detects in the priority of openness over presence, or of time over being. This article interprets the issue raised by Abe in terms of what it calls a human-centered teleological structure of time. According to Jung, "Heidegger's later philosophical orientation would, however, make superfluous Abe's contention concerning Heidegger as contrasted with the Zen master Dōgen."⁴² Similarly, Stambaugh and Jenkins identify important affinities between later Heidegger and Dōgen, particularly in connection with the fourfold.⁴³

By engaging with recently published posthumous manuscripts, this paper argues that Heidegger's later conception of the fourfold represents an overcoming of the limitations of (1) wide horizontality and (2) the form of detachment found in *Being and Time*. This development marks a more radical move away from anthropocentrism, thereby reinforcing the similarities between his later thought and Dōgen's thought.

that later Heidegger remains anthropocentric in the same sense as the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. The issue raised by Abe is not whether later Heidegger moves beyond the anthropocentric limitations of *Being and Time*, but whether this movement is sufficiently radical to eliminate the remaining privilege accorded to the human relation to time. By contrast, this paper interprets this residual privilege as closely connected with the teleological structure of temporality found in *Being and Time* and argues that later Heidegger's move beyond this structure provides grounds for reconsidering Abe's diagnosis of residual anthropocentrism.

42. Jung (1987), 244. Jung does not, however, develop this observation into a detailed analysis of later Heidegger's conception of time. His remark establishes the possibility of reconsidering Abe's criticism but does not by itself demonstrate how the temporal structure of later Heidegger overcomes the specific problem identified by Abe.

43. Stambaugh (1990), 100. According to Stambaugh, "the real affinities between Dōgen and Heidegger lie... in conceptions such as sustained exertion and perdurance (*Austrag, Inständigkeit*), thinking, gathering and the Fourfold." She also speaks, with qualification, of "Dōgen's version of the Fourfold." Stambaugh does not thereby claim that Dōgen has the same fourfold as Heidegger; she emphasizes a structural affinity between them.

Stambaugh identifies a structural affinity between Dōgen and Heidegger's fourfold, but she does not develop in detail the relation between the fourfold and Heidegger's later conception of time. Drawing on recently published posthumous manuscripts, however, it is possible to show that the "fourth dimension of time" constitutes the temporal structure of the fourfold itself. This, in turn, makes it possible to reconsider, at the level of Heidegger's later conception of time itself, the affinity with Dōgen that Stambaugh identifies primarily in the fourfold rather than in their respective explicit conceptions of time.

Jenkins (2018), 168. According to Jenkins, "the fourfold is a crucial bridge to enjoin the two philosophers." Stambaugh's and Jenkins's formulations support the view that the fourfold provides an especially important point of contact between later Heidegger and Dōgen. They should not, however, be taken to mean that Stambaugh and Jenkins have thereby established that the fourfold completely resolves Abe's objection concerning anthropocentrism. The more specific claim advanced in this paper is that, through this article's examination of Heidegger's recently published posthumous manuscripts concerning time-space, the fourth dimension of time, and the fourfold, the development of Heidegger's later conception of temporality provides grounds for reconsidering the residual anthropocentrism that Abe still detects in later Heidegger.

Commonalities in Later Heidegger's and Dōgen's Conceptions of Time: the Radicalization of Horizontality and Detachment in the Fourfold

(1) For the first point, in Heidegger's later thought, the temporal horizon of the future and the past extends beyond the individual's birth and death—limitations characteristic of *Being and Time*—to encompass the entirety of “the history of being,” thereby integrating, rather than outright rejecting, the framework of *Being and Time*. Heidegger himself acknowledges this shift already in the mid-1930s in his posthumous manuscript (GA 82), where he critically reflects on the limitations of his earlier existential perspective: “history and time-space, the “mistake” (*Fehler*) here is the limitation to the extension (*Erstreckung*) of the “in-between” (*Inzwischen*) (existential)! Birth and death only as the end of this in-between, where they themselves belong to history!” (GA 82: 132) Heidegger critiques this existential limitation as “the arrest (*Verhaftung*) in “temporality” (*Zeitlichkeit*)—care (*Sorge*)” (GA 82: 132) and laments that “the existential orientation is too narrow (*eng*) and too poor (*dürftig*)!” (GA 82: 132).

By contrast, in Dōgen's thought, the scope of time is not constrained by anthropocentric existential parameters but is inherently vast from the beginning. In “Uji,” he states that even *jōroku hasshaku* 丈六八尺 (symbolizing the Buddha) is time, as are “the great earth and the empty sky” (*daiji kokū* 大地虚空).⁴⁴

(2) For the second point, a crucial shortcoming of *Being and Time* is its inadequate detachment from purposefulness, even in anticipation of death. While anticipation of death affords a broader perspective on time (*Erstreckung*) compared to the myopic engagement of *das Man* (the everyday absorption in the present), it ultimately remains bound to the projection of particular existential possibilities. Consequently, *Being and Time* does not fully overcome the instrumentalization of time, as it continues to be oriented toward an authentically projected future. “Only being free for death gives *Dasein* its absolute goal and knocks existence into its finitude” (sz, 384). In contrast, Heidegger's conception of the fourfold moves beyond this purposive framework. As already mentioned, Heidegger critiques the earlier, objectivistic conception of the world, describing it as a “tool world” that is “bent” and “narrowed” (GA 82: 132).

In Heidegger's later thought, the fourfold signifies a mode of being in which things are inseparably entwined with earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. The thing is surrounded by the four, reflecting the four, within the time of the fourfold. Heidegger calls this movement of “time as ground” involved in the fourfold “the fourth dimension” (*die vierte Dimension*) of time in his posthumous manuscripts. “The fourth dimension” should not be understood as an additional measurable

44. Dōgen's original text in Masutani (2006), 252.

dimension, like a fourth spatial axis. It names the gathering (*Sammlung*) or nearness (*Nähe*) that lets the past, the present, and the future belong together in the first place. This may be described as an awareness of being situated within the whole temporal context of their mutual belonging. Although “Time and Being” (1962) ostensibly retains some terminological continuity with *Being and Time*, its fundamental difference is that time is no longer conceived in humanly teleological terms.⁴⁵

The precise relationship between Heidegger’s later temporal theories and the fourfold has traditionally remained ambiguous. However, an examination of recently published posthumous manuscripts clarifies that “the fourth dimension” of time is the time that constitutes the fourfold. Heidegger states that “the fourth” dimension of time is the “authentic and only dimension of the fourfold” (GA 98: 172). Heidegger also writes: “The fourfoldness (*Vierheit*) of the dimension of time in the sense of the inter-divorcing (*unterschiedlich*) time-space is based on the fourfold of inter-divorce (*Geviert des Unterschieds*) but does not coincide with it; rather, the full essencing (*Wesen*) of time is in the fouring fourfold (*das vierige Geviert*)” (GA 99: 139). Each element of the fourfold—earth, sky, divinities, and mortals—is possible within this “fourth dimension” of time.

Dōgen, by contrast, does not conceive of time in teleological terms from the outset. His assertion that pine trees and bamboos are also time reflects a fundamentally non-instrumentalized view of temporality. Pine trees and bamboos can be taken in multiple senses, like shoes in Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art,” or the jug in his lecture “The Thing” (*Das Ding*). Thus, an examination of Heidegger’s later work, particularly in light of his posthumous manuscripts, reveals that he ultimately moves beyond the anthropocentrism of his earlier theory of time, bringing his later thought into even closer alignment with Dōgen’s de-anthropocentric temporality.

The Uncontrollability of Time as Ground and the Awe it Elicits

As discussed above, Minami argues that once an objective is established, it becomes easier to structure and organize time as a means to achieve that goal. However, in the absence of a defined purpose, the temporal sequence becomes ambiguous—analogous to the way one easily forgets the order of passing scenery observed from a train when a defined destination is absent. In Dōgen’s thought, “time as ground” corresponds to this latter, indeterminate form of temporality, in which sequential order remains unclear. Ordinarily, such ambiguous experiences of time are regarded as lapses in memory, errors, or distortions that should be

45. Inoue (2015) also sees parallels between *Time and Being* (1962) and Dōgen.

rectified through accurate recollection and documentation. For Dōgen, however, this seemingly chaotic temporality constitutes the fundamental reality of time itself, whereas an orderly conception of time is a secondary, artificial construction derived from this primordial ground of time.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes “significance” (*Bedeutsamkeit*) as the temporal mechanism that enables *Dasein* to interpret a being—a hammer—as what it is. However, in anticipation of death, familiar, routinely ordered time is radically dismantled. Through this existential confrontation, an authentic possibility is projected, the past is retrieved as an authentic past, and the entire order of time is reorganized. This implies that, as in Dōgen’s view, a more fundamental form of time underlies sequential, teleological time, serving as the very condition for its emergence. During the period of *Being and Time*, however, both everyday time and authentic temporality were framed within a teleological structure. Heidegger’s focus at this time was not on the dynamic process through which time undergoes reconfiguration—what he later refers to as the “unity” (*Einheit*) of time—nor on the more fundamental, pervasive temporality that underlies and enables these transformations. In a posthumous manuscript written in his later years, Heidegger self-critiques *Being and Time* as follows: “First of all, in ‘Being and Time’ the question of the ‘unity’ (*Einheit*) of the three ecstasies is not discussed anywhere - because the unity, that first one, cannot be grasped from any of them” (GA 82: 250). According to Heidegger, such “unity” is “the fourth dimension of time”: “‘Time’—it has not one and not three, but four ‘dimensions.’ The fourth, however, is the first. The first here does not mean the series of ordinal numbers, but the essencing in the event (*das Wesende im Ereignis*). This determines the essencing of the dimensional (*das Wesen des Dimensionalen*). The first is the lighting-covering (distant) eventful inter-divorcing ‘closeness’ (*die lichtend-bergende [fernende] ereignishaft unterschiedliche »Nähe«*), in which an own arrival (*Ankommen*) and therefore initially the “future” and the known characters are emphasized” (GA 82: 250).

By the mid-1930s, “The Origin of the Work of Art” reinterpreted the “significance” of *Being and Time*, reducing it to a discourse primarily concerned with “usefulness” (*Dienlichkeit*) (GA 5: 18). Heidegger then introduces a deeper stratum—“reliability” (*Verlässlichkeit*)—which underlies and makes possible the domain of usefulness. This shift is exemplified in his discussion of Van Gogh’s famous painting of shoes, where the depicted shoes are not merely understood in terms of their instrumental function (“to wear”), but as things that belong to a more profound reality of the “earth” (*Erde*) and the “world” (*Welt*). Although “The Origin of the Work of Art” does not explicitly address the temporality that underpins this dimension of reliability, it is this deeper aspect of time that Heidegger would later explore more fully in his lecture “Time and Being” and posthumous writings. In these later works, Heidegger turns his attention to a pervasive, pre-objective temporality that

underlies the teleological, goal-oriented structure of time. He refers to this as “the fourth dimension of time,” a notion that is also central to his conception of the fourfold. This form of temporality bears striking similarities to Dōgen’s notion of aimless time.

This pervasive aspect of time resists objectification and instrumental control.⁴⁶ For both Heidegger and Dōgen, this fundamental nature of time is intimately tied to a certain religiosity. It entails an awareness of what exceeds human control, as articulated in Dōgen’s notion of *kū* (emptiness) and Heidegger’s notion of the “divinities” within the fourfold. Rather, they may be understood here as naming the dimension of what exceeds human control and gives measure to human existence).⁴⁷ This recognition fosters a sense of awe before what exceeds human grasp, along with an attitude of attentiveness and engagement with this religiosity to the extent possible.⁴⁸

Neither Dōgen nor later Heidegger treats enlightenment or the divine simply as a future goal to be attained through purposive human effort. Both emphasize attentiveness to what exceeds human control. In this respect, their thought challenges the treatment of the present merely as a means to a future attainment. Heidegger’s later notion of “waiting” (*das Warten*) and Dōgen’s practice of “just sitting” (*shikantaza* 只管打坐) may thus be read as forms of openness that cannot be reduced to the pursuit of a predetermined future goal and that also cultivate an awareness of the overwhelming character of the reality already present. As Tsunoda emphasizes, “just” in Dōgen’s “just sitting” does not mean that an ego performs *zazen* (sitting) to become a Buddha. Rather, it indicates a non-teleological practice in which sitting is not subordinated to an external goal. In this respect, Dōgen’s “just sitting”—described by Tsunoda as “sitting sits sitting”—may be read alongside Heidegger’s later formulations, such as “the world worlds” (*die Welt weltet*), insofar as both displace the event from the purposive activity of a subject.⁴⁹

46. This may be similar to how Freud’s unconscious remains elusive to direct conscious manipulation.

47. See Todoroki (2023), 462. “The inclusion of the ‘divine’ among these four may seem particularly arbitrary. However, the acceptance of ‘things’ as ‘things’ by ‘human beings’ presupposes the acceptance of the constraints of ‘earth’ and ‘sky’ as one’s destiny. And this is nothing less than the recognition of what is not at one’s will, the domination of the Other that gives one one’s own norm. If we call such an occasion ‘the divine’ as sacred and inviolable, then ‘earth,’ ‘sky,’ and ‘mortality’ are inseparable from ‘the divine.’”

48. Cf. Virilio (1990), 152. Paul Virilio argues that modern technology fosters the illusion that everything can be subject to control, thereby dulling our sensitivity to the very world we inhabit, which is filled with coincidences. He suggests that a return to phenomenology—reawakening the sensitivity inherent in human beings—may allow for the recovery of a lost sense of religiosity.

49. Tsunoda (2020) quotes the following words of Dōgen’s from *Shōbōgenzō zuimonki* volume 6: “Those who study Buddhism should not study Buddhism for their own sake. They should learn Buddhism for the sake of Buddhism.” According to Tsunoda, this “for the sake of” here is not the ordinary “for the sake of.” There is no “I” (ego). It is “for the sake of” without the “self.” This is what “just” (*tada*) means [in Dōgen’s “just sitting” (*shikantaza; tada suwaru*)]. Tsunoda describes this “just” as follows: “It is not that ‘I’ do ‘zazen’ and become a ‘Buddha,’” rather, “sitting sits sitting” (*zazen ga zazen o zazen suru*) and “buddha buddhas

Conclusion

This article has examined Dōgen's and Heidegger's conceptions of time through the distinction between the "figure" and the "ground" of time. Both thinkers reject the view that time consists merely of a succession of isolated present moments, understood here as "figure." Instead, for both, each moment or being becomes meaningful only within a broader temporal field, understood here as "ground." Yet, with respect to both horizontality and detachment, Heidegger's *Being and Time* remains limited. Its temporal horizon is still centered on *Dasein*, and its detachment from everyday concern remains bound to the projection of inauthentic and authentic possibilities. By contrast, Dōgen's *uji* is already more radically non-anthropocentric and non-teleological. In Dōgen, each being is constituted as an individual time, while at the same time these beings are mutually related within "the entire world" (*jinkai*), a non-teleological and all-encompassing temporal field. Later Heidegger's thought deepens these two points. With time understood as a gathering that exceeds human control and instrumental use, the fourfold and the fourth dimension of time expand horizontality beyond *Dasein* and radicalize detachment from instrumental and purposive understandings of time. In this respect, later Heidegger's conception of time may be understood as moving closer to Dōgen's. Thus, both Dōgen and the later Heidegger invite us to understand time not as something to be fully mastered, but as the ground within which beings appear and to which human beings are called to respond with detachment, receptivity, and awe.

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buddha" (*hotoke ga hotoke o hotoke suru*). This is similar to later Heidegger's "the world worlds" (*die Welt weltet*) after Heidegger criticized his own concept of the world based on "for the sake of" in *Being and Time*.

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Abbreviations

GA Heidegger, Martin. *Gesamtausgabe*. Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–. References give the volume number followed by the page number.

sz Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*. References are to the standard German pagination reproduced in the margins of the English translation by Joan Stambaugh; see Heidegger (1996).